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ABSTRACT
Graph aggregation is the process of computing a single output 
graph that constitutes a good compromise between several input 
graphs, each provided by a different source. One needs to perform 
graph aggregation in a wide variety of situations, e.g., when apply-
ing a voting rule (graphs as preference orders), when consolidating 
conflicting views regarding the relationships between arguments in 
a debate (graphs as abstract argumentation frameworks), or when 
computing a consensus between several alternative clusterings of 
a given dataset (graphs as equivalence relations). Other potential 
applications include belief merging, data integration, and social net-
work analysis. In this short paper, we review a recently introduced 
formal framework for graph aggregation that is grounded in so-
cial choice theory. Our focus is on understanding which properties 
shared by the individual input graphs will transfer to the output 
graph returned by a given aggregation rule. Our main result is a 
powerful impossibility theorem that generalises Arrow’s seminal 
result regarding the aggregation of preference orders to a large 
collection of different types of graphs. We also provide a discussion 
of existing and potential applications of graph aggregation.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Suppose each of the members of a group of autonomous agents pro-
vides us with a different directed graph that is defined on a common 
set of vertices. Graph aggregation is the task of computing a single 
graph over the same set of vertices that, in some sense, represents a 
good compromise between the various individual views expressed
by the agents. Graphs are ubiquitous in computer science and arti#-
cial intelligence (AI). For example, in the context of decision support
systems, an edge from vertex x to vertex y might indicate that al-
ternative x is preferred to alternative y. In the context of modelling
interactions taking place on an online debating platform, an edge
from x to y might indicate that argument x undercuts or otherwise
attacks argument y. And in the context of social network analysis,
an edge from x to y might express that person x is in"uenced by
person y. How to best perform graph aggregation is a relevant
question in these three domains, as well as in any other domain
where particular graphs may be supplied by di!erent agents or
originate from di!erent sources. For example, in an election, we
have to aggregate the preferences of several voters. In a debate, we
sometimes have to aggregate the views of the individual partici-
pants in the debate. And when trying to understand the dynamics
within a community, we sometimes have to aggregate information
coming from several di!erent social networks.
In recent work [13], we introduced a formal framework for study-
ing graph aggregation in general abstract terms and demonstrated
its relevance to a wide range of applications. The present paper
provides a compact exposition of this contribution. Our framework
provides tools for evaluating what constitutes a “good” method of
aggregation and it allows us to ask questions regarding the existence
of methods that meet a certain set of requirements. Our approach
is inspired by work in social choice theory [2], which o!ers a rich
framework for the study of aggregation rules for preferences—a
very speci#c class of graphs. Our technical results focus on the
conditions under which an aggregation rule will preserve certain
attractive properties of graphs during aggregation.
Related work. Our work builds on and is related to contributions
in the #eld of social choice theory, starting with the seminal contri-
bution of Arrow [1]. This concerns, in particular, contributions to
the theory of voting and preference aggregation [2, 24, 26], but also
judgment aggregation [9, 16, 21]. In computer science, these frame-
works are studied in the #eld of computational social choice [5]. As
we shall discuss in some detail, graph aggregation is an abstraction
of several more speci#c forms of aggregation taking place in a wide
range of di!erent domains. Aggregation of speci#c types of graphs
has been studied, for instance, in nonmonotonic reasoning [10],
belief merging [23], social network analysis [29], clustering [14],
and argumentation in multiagent systems [7].
Paper overview. Section 2 introduces our framework of graph
aggregation. Section 3 presents our main technical results, showing
that certain desirable properties of aggregation rules are impossible
to realise simultaneously. Section 4, #nally, discusses applications.
2
2 GRAPH AGGREGATION
In this section, we present the basic de#nitions of our model, and 
some examples for aggregation rules and axiomatic properties.
2.1 Basic Notation and Terminology
Fix a #nite set of vertices V. A (directed) graph G  = 〈V , E〉 based on 
V is de#ned by a set of edges E  ⊆ V ×V . We write xEy for (x ,y) ∈ E. 
AsV is #xed, G is in fact fully determined by E. We therefore identify 
sets of edges E ⊆ V × V with the graphs G = 〈V , E〉 they de#ne. 
For any kind of set S , we use 2S to denote the powerset of S . So 
2
V ×V is the set of all graphs. We use E (x ) := {y ∈ V | (x ,y) ∈ E} 
to denote the set of successors of a vertex x in a set of edges E.
A given graph may or may not satisfy a speci#c property, such 
as transitivity, re"exivity, or more complex properties coming from 
speci#c application domains, such as negative transitivity used in 
economics or the Euclidean property familiar from modal logic. 
We are going to be interested in families of graphs that all satisfy 
several of these properties. It will often be useful to think of a graph 
property P , such as transitivity, as a subset of 2V ×V .
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a #nite set of (two or more) individuals (or 
agents). We are going to refer to subsets of N as coalitions. Suppose 
every individual i ∈ N speci#es a graph E i ⊆ V  ×V. This gives rise
to a pro!le E  =  (E1, . . . , En ) . We use N eE := { i ∈  N  |  e  ∈  Ei }  to 
denote the coalition of individuals accepting edge e under pro#le E.
An aggregation rule is a function F : (2V ×V )n → 2V ×V , mapping 
any pro#le of individual graphs into a single graph. An example 
for an aggregation rule is the majority rule, accepting a given edge 
if and only if more than half of the individuals accept it.
2.2 Speci!c Aggregation Rules
Under a quota rule, an edge will be included in the graph returned 
by the rule, if the number of individuals accepting it meets a certain 
quota. Formally, a quota rule is a rule Fq de#ned via a  function 
q : V × V → {0, 1, . . . , n+1}, associating each edge with a quota:
Fq : E 7→ {e ∈ V × V : |Ne
E | > q(e )}
Fq is called a uniform quota rule in case q is a constant function. 
The uniform quota rules include three simple and well-known 
rules: the (strict) majority rule Fmaj is the uniform quota rule with
q = ⌈ n+1 ⌉, the intersection rule F∩ is the uniform quota rule with
q = n, and the union rule F∪ is the uniform quota rule with q = 1.
The idea of using quota rules is natural andwidespread. For example,
quota rules have been studied in judgment aggregation [8].
Next, we present a new class of aggregation rules speci#cally
designed for graphs that is inspired by approval voting [4]. Imagine
we associate each vertex with an election in which all the possible
successors of that vertex are the candidates (and in which there
may be more than one winner). Each agent votes by stating which
vertices she considers acceptable successors. Based on this infor-
mation, a choice function v : (2V )n → 2V selects which edges to
include in the outcome graph. Formally, the successor-approval rule
based on v is the aggregation rule Fv de#ned by stipulating:
Fv : E 7→ {(x ,y) ∈ V ×V | y ∈ v (E1 (x ), . . . ,En (x ))}
For example, such a rule might accept exactly those successors
of a given vertex x that receive above-average support.
2.3 Axiomatic Properties
When choosing an aggregation rule, we need to consider its proper-
ties. In social choice theory, such properties are called axioms [26].
We now introduce three basic axioms for graph aggregation.
First, we introduce an independence condition that requires that
the decision of whether or not a given edge e is to be accepted
by a rule should only depend on which of the individual graphs
include e . This corresponds to well-known axioms in preference
and judgment aggregation [1, 22]. Formally, an aggregation rule F
is called independent of irrelevant edges (IIE) if N Ee = N
E
′
e implies
e ∈ F (E) ⇔ e ∈ F (E′). That is, if exactly the same individuals
accept e under pro#les E and E′, then F should either accept e in
both cases or it should reject e in both cases.
Next, the fundamental economic principle of unanimity requires
that an edge should be accepted by a group in case all individuals
in that group accept it. Formally, an aggregation rule F is called
unanimous if it is always the case that F (E) ⊇ E1 ∩ · · · ∩ En .
Finally, a requirement that, in some sense, is dual to unanimity
is to ask that the outcome graph should only include edges that
are part of at least one of the individual graphs. In the context
of ontology aggregation this axiom has been introduced under
the name groundedness [25]. Formally, an aggregation F is called
grounded if it is always the case that F (E) ⊆ E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En .
Whether or not to insist on a given axiom depends on the appli-
cation at hand. Unanimity and groundedness are uncontroversial
and certainly desirable in most contexts. Independence is much
harder to satisfy, but very useful when it can be guaranteed, as
it greatly simpli#es the process of aggregation. For example, all
quota rules are independent, but (for most natural choices of v)
successor-approval rules are not.
2.4 Collective Rationality
To what extent can a given aggregation rule ensure that a given
property that is satis#ed by each of the individual input graphs will
be preserved during aggregation? This question relates to a well-
studied concept in social choice theory, often referred to as collective
rationality [1, 21]. In the literature, collective rationality is usually
de#ned w.r.t. a speci#c property that should be preserved (e.g., the
transitivity of preferences or the logical consistency of judgments).
Here, instead, we formulate a de#nition that is parametric w.r.t. a
given graph property.
Formally, an aggregation rule F is called collectively rational w.r.t.
a graph property P if F (E) satis#es P whenever all of the individual
graphs in a given pro#le E = (E1, . . . ,En ) do.
Example 2.1 (Collective rationality). Suppose three individuals
provide us with three graphs over the same set V = {x ,y, z,w }:
x y z
w
x y z
w
x y z
w
x y z
w
If we apply the majority rule, then we obtain the graph to the right
of the arrow. Thus, the majority rule is not collectively rational w.r.t.
seriality (the property of every vertex having a successor), as each
individual graph is serial, but the graph returned by the rule is not.
The property of symmetry, on the other hand, is preserved in this case.
3 IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
In social choice theory, an impossibility theorem states that it is not 
possible to devise an aggregation rule that satis#es certain axioms 
and that is also collectively rational w.r.t. a certain combination of 
properties of the structures being aggregated (which in our case 
are graphs). In this section, we present two powerful impossibility 
theorems for graph aggregation, the Oligarchy Theorem and the 
Dictatorship Theorem, derived in the original paper [13].
The Dictatorship Theorem is inspired by—and signi#cantly 
generalises—the seminal impossibility result for preference aggre-
gation due to Arrow, #rst published in 1951 [1]. Our proof technique 
makes use of winning coalitions, i.e., sets of individuals who can 
force the acceptance or rejection of a given edge, and it hinges on the 
de#nition of three meta-properties for classifying graph properties: 
contagiousness, implicativeness, and disjunctiveness. Intuitively 
speaking, a graph property P is contagious if, under certain condi-
tions, acceptance of one edge forces us to also accept one of the 
edges adjacent to that #rst edge; P  is implicative if, again under cer-
tain conditions, the acceptance of two speci#c edges e1 and e2 forces 
us to also accept a third edge e3; #nally, P  is disjunctive if there are 
two speci#c edges e 1 and e 2 such that, under certain conditions, we 
always need to accept at least one of them. We refer to the original 
paper for the precise de#nition of these meta-properties [13].
An aggregation rule F is called oligarchic (on nonre"exive edges) 
if there exists a coalition C⋆ ⊆ N (the “oligarchs”) such that any 
given nonre"exive edge e  is accepted by F  if and only if all of the 
members of C⋆ accept e . Thus, oligarchic rules are highly restrictive 
and unattractive for most applications.
Theorem 3.1 (Oligarchy Theorem). Let P be a graph property 
that is contagious and implicative. Then, for |V | > 3, any unanimous, 
grounded, and IIE aggregation rule F that is collectively rational
w.r.t. P must be oligarchic on nonre"exive edges.
An aggregation rule F is called dictatorial (on nonre"exive edges)
if there exists an individual i⋆ ∈ N (the “dictator”) such that any
given edge e is accepted by F if and only if i⋆ accepts e .
Theorem 3.2 (Dictatorship Theorem). Let P be a graph prop-
erty that is contagious, implicative, and disjunctive. Then, for |V | > 3,
any unanimous, grounded, and IIE aggregation rule F that is collec-
tively rational w.r.t. P must be dictatorial on nonre"exive edges.
Arrow’s Theorem, which states the impossibility of aggregating
preference orders (i.e., graphs that are re"exive, transitive, and com-
plete), is a corollary of Theorem 3.2, since transitivity is a graph
property that is contagious and implicative, while completeness is
a graph property that is disjunctive. In general, any combination of
graph properties that together hit all three meta-properties, by The-
orem 3.2, gives rise to an impossibility theorem saying that all rele-
vant aggregation rules are dictatorial. Similarly, any combination
of graph properties that together hit the #rst two meta-properties,
by Theorem 3.1, gives rise to an impossibility theorem saying that
the only relevant aggregation rules are oligarchic.
4 APPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Directed graphs are ubiquitous in computer science and beyond.
They have been used as modelling devices for a wide range of appli-
cations. In this section, we sketch a number of di!erent application
scenarios for graph aggregation, each requiring di!erent types of
graphs (satisfying di!erent properties) to model relevant objects of
interest, and each requiring di!erent types of aggregation rules.
We are also going to hint at how our impossibility theorems
can be put to good use, to help clarify what is and what is not
achievable in di!erent application domains. Some of the results
we have been able to obtain in this manner are new, while others
demonstrate how our approach can be used to clarify known results
and to obtain signi#cantly simpler proofs for them [13].
Bounded rationality in preference aggregation. The most immedi-
ate example for a graph aggregation problem is preference aggrega-
tion as classically studied in social choice theory [1]. In this context,
vertices are interpreted as alternatives available in an election and
the graphs considered—interpreted as preference orders—are re-
"exive, transitive, and complete. Aggregation rules then reduce to
so-called social welfare functions. While the types of preferences
typically considered in classical social choice theory are required to
be complete, recent work in AI has also addressed the aggregation
of partial preference orders, to account for the bounded rationality
of agents. That is, agents may be unable to rank all alternatives.
A prominent example in this literature is the work of Pini et al.
[24]. Their main result is a variant of Arrow’s Theorem for partial
preference orders with maxima or minima, a result that can be
obtained with a simple proof as a corollary of our Theorem 3.2.
Knowledge. If we think of V as a set of possible worlds, then
a graph on V that is re"exive and transitive (and possibly also
symmetric) can be used to model an agent’s knowledge: (x ,y)
being an edge means that, if x is the actual world, then our agent
will consider y a possible world [19]. If we aggregate the graphs
of several agents by taking their intersection, then the resulting
collective graph represents the distributed knowledge of the group,
i.e., the knowledge the members of the group can infer by pooling
all their individual resources. If, on the other hand, we aggregate by
taking the union of the individual graphs, then we obtain what is
sometimes called the shared or mutual knowledge of the individual
agents, i.e., the part of the knowledge available to each and every
individual on their own. Finally, if we aggregate by computing the
transitive closure of the union of the individual graphs, then we
obtain a model of the group’s common knowledge. These concepts
play a role in disciplines as diverse as epistemology [20], game
theory [3], and distributed systems [18].
Nonmonotonic reasoning and belief merging. When an intelligent
agent attempts to update her beliefs or to decide what action to
take, she may resort to several patterns of common-sense inference
that will sometimes be in con"ict with each other. To take a famous
example, we may wish to infer that Nixon is a paci#st, because he
is a Quaker and Quakers by default are paci#sts, and we may at
the same time wish to infer that Nixon is not a paci#st, because he
is a Republican and Republicans by default are not paci#sts. In a
popular approach to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI, such default
inference rules are modelled as graphs that encode the relative
plausibility of di!erent conclusions [27]. Thus, here the possible
conclusions are the vertices and we obtain a graph by linking one
vertex with another, if the former is considered at least as plausible
as the latter. Con"ict resolution between di!erent rules of inference
then requires us to aggregate such plausibility orders, to be able 
to determine what the ultimately most plausible state of the world 
might be. In this context, we were able to show that a well-known 
impossibility result from this literature, due to Doyle and Wellman 
[10], is a straightforward corollary of our Theorem 3.2. Our results 
also allow us to clarify the underlying reasons for a possibility 
result established by Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann [23].
Argumentation. In a so-called abstract argumentation framework, 
arguments are taken to be vertices in a graph and attacks between 
arguments are modelled as directed edges between them [11]. A 
graph property of interest in this context is acyclicity, as that makes 
it easier to decide which arguments to ultimately accept. If we think 
of V as the collection of arguments proposed in a debate, a pro#le 
E = (E1, . . . , En ) speci#es an attack relation for each of a number 
of agents that we may wish to aggregate into a collective attack 
relation before attempting to determine which of the arguments 
might be acceptable to the group. Recent work has addressed the 
challenge of aggregating several abstract argumentation frame-
works from a number of angles [7, 12]. Our approach has already 
proved useful in obtaining novel results in this setting [6].
Social networks. We may also think of each of the graphs in a 
pro#le as a di!erent social network relating members of the same 
population. One of these networks might describe work relations, 
another might model family relations, and a third might have been 
induced from similarities in online purchasing behaviour. Social 
networks are often modelled using undirected graphs, which we 
can simulate in our framework by requiring all graphs to be sym-
metric. Aggregating individual graphs then amounts to #nding a 
single meta-network that describes relationships at a global level. 
Alternatively, we may wish to aggregate several graphs represent-
ing snapshots of the same social network at di!erent points in time. 
The meta-network obtained can be helpful when studying the social 
structures within the population under scrutiny [29].
Consensus clustering. Clustering is the attempt of partitioning 
a given set of data points into several clusters. The intention is 
that the data points in the same cluster should be more similar to 
each other than each of them is to data points belonging to one 
of the other clusters. While this is useful in many disciplines, the 
#eld is lacking a precise de#nition of what constitutes a “correct” 
partitioning of the data and there are many di!erent clustering 
algorithms, such as k-means or single-linkage clustering, and even 
more parameterisations of those basic algorithms [28]. Observe 
that every partitioning that might get returned by a clustering algo-
rithm induces an equivalence relation (i.e., a graph that is re"exive, 
symmetric, and transitive): two data points are equivalent if and 
only if they belong to the same cluster. Finding a compromise be-
tween the solutions suggested by several clustering algorithms is 
what is known as consensus clustering [15]. This thus amounts to 
aggregating several graphs that are equivalence relations. One of 
the classical results in this area, due to Fishburn and Rubinstein 
[14], is an immediate corollary to our Theorem 3.1 .
Data integration. A promising direction for future research in 
graph aggregation, in the area of the Semantic Web, concerns XML 
data integration [17]. The basic structure underlying documents 
encoded in XML is that of a tree, i.e., a special kind of graph. Thus,
if we want to combine information encoded using XML that has
been obtained from di!erent sources on the Semantic Web, we need
to use some form of graph aggregation as well.
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